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May  1987 I.  introduction 
Economic development has  become a major concern of many local 
pol  icymakers.  The most recent recession, by cutting deep into many urban 
economies, has left local  officials scrambling to claim what they 
consider to  be their share of  the national  economic expansion.  Although 
competition for economic activity has considerable historical precedent, 
at present regional rivalry appears to  be particularly keen as snowbelt 
states fight to slow the loss of  manufacturing facilities to  the southern 
and western regions of the country.  One of  the primary instruments 
available to local  policymakers to  retain, nurture and attract firms is 
the formation of public infrastructure.  Maintenance and expansion of 
public infrastructure such as highways, water distribution and treatment 
facilities, airports, and waterways are important factors in the decision 
of  firms to  expand and  locate. 
The recent interest in the use of public infrastructure to  promote 
economic development differs  to some extent from the regional and federal 
development projects of the late 1950s and 1960s.  These programs, such 
as the Appalachian development effort, involved massive infusions of 
money from higher levels of government in an attempt to  provide these 
regions with a critical mass of infrastructure  that would presumably 
stimulate economic growth.  In contrast, infrastructure development at 
the individual  local  level  is much less ambitious.  Although federal 
grants are an important financing source of  some local  projects, to  a 
large extent, local  public investment is financed out of  local  and state 
revenues, which are under the control of  area taxpayers.  These funds are 
spent on local  roads, water distribution and treatment facilities,. school  s, and other bui  ldings and structures.  State and local  governments 
spent over 238.5  billion dollars on equipment and structures in 1978 
alone, which is nearly 73 percent of  total government expenditures on 
capital  (Musgrave, 1981). 
Despite the importance of these factors to businesses and local 
government officials, very  1 i ttle work has been done to  explore the 
relationship between private and public investment.  Investigation  into 
this relationship has  been plagued primarily by the lack of adequate 
data.  Even with recent interest in the deterioration of  the nation's 
public infrastructure, estimates of public capital  stock for local  areas, 
which provide consistent measures across standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSAs),  have not been made.  In addition, information 
on plant location and estimates of local  private capital  stock is not 
readily available.  In response to  the lack of data to  explore these 
issues concerning local  economic development, we have undertaken a 
project to measure private and pub1  i c capital stocks for 52 SMSAs  -from 
1958-1  978. 
The fundamental  issue raised in this paper concerns the use and 
effectiveness of  public infrastructure as a local  policy instrument.  A 
necessary condition for local  public investment to influence economic 
development is for the formation o'f  public investment to  precede the 
formation of private investment.  Obviously, the timing of investment  i s 
not sufficient for public investment to  be an effective policy 
instrument, since many other locational  and market factors are important 
in business decisions.  Nonetheless, such a sequence of events would 
indicate that local  areas, through either deliberate local policy or  the 
desire of local  voters, actively use public outlays as an instrument to try to direct loca-l  development.  On the other hand, if the sequence of 
events occurs in the opposite direction, it would appear that local 
officials mere,ly  respond to  the location of  private economic activity by 
putting in  place infrastructure after private investment has been made. 
One could argue that the installation of  roads and sewer and water lines, 
for example, may be prearranged  before a business decides to locate in an 
area, even though the actual  construction does not occur unti  1  after the 
private faci  1 i ty has been bui  l t.  Considering, however, the amount of 
time necessary to build structures and the fact that we are looking at 
the aggregate behavior of many individuals, one would expect that over a 
sufficiently  long period of time the likelihood of perfect timing andlor 
foresight would be very small. 
To answer the question of whether local  public investment 
"influences" private investment,  we perform the Sims test of  "Granger 
causality"  for a sample of 40 SMSAs using investment data from 1904 to 
1978.  Granger's definition of causality is based  upon the predictive 
ability of  one series to  explain another.  Granger states that X  "causes" 
Y if the past history of  X  can be used to predict Y more accurately than 
by simply using the past history of Y.  While this definition is not in 
complete accord with the notion of causality held  by philosophers of 
science,  it  has considerable appeal for examining statistical 
relationships since, under certain a priori restrictions, it is 
equivalent to  econometric exogenei  ty.  Sargent (19761, for example, used 
the Sims procedure to  test for exogeneity of  policy variables in his 
macro model.  We perform the Sims test on public and private investment 
series to  test if public investment is exogenous or if  there are strong feedbacks from private to  public investment. 
The issue of exogeneity addresses a secondary area of  concern:  can 
public investment be considered exogenous in econometric models?  One of 
our goals in investigating the relationship between public and private 
investment is to  determine the effect of public infrastructure on the 
productivity of urban economies.  Thus, the issue of  exogeneity is 
important when entering public capital stock into production functions, 
private investment equations, regional  economic growth models, and firm 
location equations. 
For now, however, we perform the Sims test on investment series of 
each of 40 SMSAs.  We then examine whether the patterns of significant 
directional relationships can be explained by various characteristics of 
these local  economies.  Finally, we consider the sign and magnitude of 
the correlation between the two  time series for a subsample of  the 40 
SMSAs  . 
11.  Econometric Specification 
Urban Economic Model  A  simple model of the urban economy 
demonstrates the relationship between private and public capital and the 
possibility that the direction of  influence  between the two investment 
series may go  in either direction. ' 
Public infrastructure can be viewed as both an intermediate and a 
final  good.  Local  residents consume services from pub1  i c capital  stock 
as a final good; local firms use public capital  stock as a factor of 
production.  In both cases, public capital  is not purchased directly but is financed  by  tax  dollars,  the amount  determined  within the political 
process.  The  process  by  whi ch  local  pub1 i  c investment i  nf  1  uences  private 
investment  and  vice versa  can be  illustrated by  constructing a simple, 
export base  model  of a local economy.  Similar models  are found  in 
Pest i  eau  (  1976)  and  Kanemoto  (1  980). 
Assume  that manufacturing firms within the local area purchase  local 
inputs (private capital, K,  and  labor,  L)  that,  when  combined  with local 
public capital  (GI produces  Q,  an  output  that is sold to  a national 
market.  The  issue of how  public capital enters  the production  function 
has  been  discussed theoretically by  Negishi  (1973).  He  shows  that public 
capital,  viewed as  an  unpaid factor of production,  renders  the production 
function  homogeneous  of degree  one  with respect to a1 1 inputs,  including 
public capital.  Furthermore,  he  argues  that if  public and  private 
capital  stock are not  substitutes,  the higher rents accruing to firms  due 
to the level of public capital  will attract additional firms into the 
area.  Thus,  private capital  investment  is  a function of public 
infrastructure investment.  These  relationships can  be  shown  by  positing 
a general  production function: 
Since  G  is determined exogenously,  it  is  considered a quasi-fixed input. 
Also,  since G  is  not a pure public good  in  the Samuelsonian  sense, 
congestion may  occur  depending upon  the number  of firms  that use  the 
good.  A  congestion  factor could be  entered into the model  as where  g,  is the amount  of services from G  received by  the ith  firm, 
which  is  a function of the level of total output and  a congestion 
parameter  (0<0<  1  > .  Si  nce  thi  s  addi tional characteri  sti  c  wi  1  1 not change 
the general  relationship between  private and  public investment,  it is  not 
included in  the model.  The  publicness of the services from  public 
capital  stock,  however,  may  be  one  of several  reasons  why  public and 
private investment may  not be  strongly correlated for some  SMSAs,  if 
indeed  this turns out to  be  the case. 
Under  certain regularity conditions,  the demand  for private capital 
and  labor  can  be  described as  a function of public capital: 
(2)  K  =  K(w,r,Q,G)  and 
(3)  L =  L(w,r,Q,G), 
where  w  is the wage  rate and r  is the price of capital. 
Local  income  is  generated  through  the payroll of  manufacturing firms 
in  the area.  Dollars spent  by manufacturing  workers  on  local services 
create additional local  income  according  to  the multiplier 8.  Thus, 
Public goods  are provided through the political process  in  which the 
preferences of the median  voter determine  the level of public 
expenditures.  Businesses  do not have  direct input into the political process.  Their preferences may be conveyed through lobbying efforts 
directed at voters or  government officials.  Furthermore, communities 
with large industrial  complexes may simply have more money to  spend on 
public outlays. 
At this stage, we keep the model  simple and adopt a median voter 
model  to  determine the level of  public outlays.  The utility of the 
median voter is a function of  a composite private good, X;  and public 
capital  stock, G.  Of course, the median voter consumes other pub1  ic 
serivces, but it serves our purpose to  consider only G.  The median voter 
maximizes uti  1 i ty,  subject to  a budget constraint: 
(5)  max  U(X,G)  s.t.  pxX+pGyG=Y, 
where p,  is the price of the private good, p,  is the unit cost of the 
public capital  good, and y is the median voter's  share of the cost of 
the public capital good.  We assume that local  public goods are produced 
efficiently.  First order conditions yield a demand function for G: 
Again, a congestion function could be specified as described for the 
production function.  Since the income of  the median voter is a function 
of the wage rate and the demand for labor by firms in the community, the 
demand for publlc infrastructure is also a function of  the level of 
private capital investment. Within this simple  framework,  the relationship between  public and 
private capital may  be  in  either direction:  public capital may  actively 
influence private capital , or private capital may  actively influence 
public capital.  That  is, G  influences K  directly through the production 
function;  or K  influences  G  indirectly by  influencing L  and  thus  Y. 
Although firms and  taxpayers  benefit from the services  they receive 
from capital  stock,  policy decisions are usually made  with regard to 
investment.  Capital  stock  is the result of past investment  decisions. 
With  constant  depreciation patterns over  time,  the formation of capital 
stock follows the timing of investment decisions.  Thus,  public and 
private investment  series are used  to  examine  the  issue.of directional 
relationships. 
Sims Test  The  Sims  test is basically a test of predictiveness.  At 
best,  it  can  test Granger's  statistical definition of causality.  At the 
least, it  can  test whether  an  optimal  prediction of one  series depends 
upon  another.  The  ability to  test a specific hypothesis depends  upon 
a priori restrictions placed on  the  structural equations.  This problem 
with "causality" testing was  first reported by  Jacobs,  Learner,  and  Ward 
(1979).  To  illustrate their point,  they  consider a simple structural 
model  that serves our purpose  of  model ing the relationship between 
private and  public investment.  Consider  the possibility that public 
outlays  (g)  explain private investment  (k): and  the possibility that private investment  (k> explains public 
investment  (9): 
where  (t-1)  is a generalized delay of i  periods  and  clt  and  ctt 
are  independent,  serial  ly  uncorrelated random  variables with zero means 
and  variances a:  a:,  respectively. 
The  reduced  form of this structural  system  is 
Since  we  are concerned  about  feedback  from  private to  public 
investment,  we  focus  on  three hypotheses  that describe the extent k 
influences g: 
H1:  t=Ozz=O.  JLW  refer  to this hypothesis  as  "k does  not cause 
g,"  or that a policy that controlled k  by  selecting the error 
clt  could not have  any  impact  on  the g variable. 
Hz:  T=O.  JLW  refer  to this as  "g  is  contemporaneously  exogenous." 
3:  tB1l+Ozl=O=nzl.  This  is the hypothesis  that an 
optimal prediction of g does  not depend on  k.  JLW  refer to this 
as  "k  is  not informative about  future g." 
As  they note,  H,  is  often mistaken  for  the causality hypothesis  (HI). 
Since  the structural model  is  not identified and  none  of the parameters  can 
be  estimated,  it  Is  not possible  to  estimate T  and  0 and  thus not 
possible  to test HI.  What  can  be  estimated is  nzl. If it  is discovered that nzl  is zero,  then k is not informative about future. 
g.  If, furthermore, one could restrict T to  be zero, then the finding 
that nzl=O  would infer that Dzl  is also  equal  to  zero--thus g is 
exogenous to  the model. 
JLW  further show that the informativeness hypothesis (H3: 
nzl=O)  is not a useful  indicator of  simultaneous equation bias.  All 
that is required for consistent estimates is that r=O.  In our 
particular circumstance, it  is reasonable to  assume that private and 
public investment are not contemporaneously correlated.  The formation of 
public capital  stock, in  particular, requires a considerable amount of 
time.  Roads, highways, airports, ports, water treatment and sewer 
facilities, for example, take a number of years to build.  Add to  this an 
equally long period of  time required for  private capital  formation, it  is 
highly unlikely that over a long period of time, public and private 
investment are consistently contemporaneous. 
Therefore, with the a prior1 restriction that r=o, it is possible 
to interpret the results of the Sims test as a test of exogeneity.  Even 
without this restriction, the Sims test indicates the ability of  g  to 
explain k and vice versa. 
The Sims test regresses current g  on past, current, and future values 
of  k.  The null  hypothesis that g is not informative about k is 
equivalent .to.all  the coefficients on the future values of k being equal. 
to  zero.  Thus, the two-sided regression model  is estimated: An  analogous  regression of  k  on past and  future g is then estimated to 
test if k  is informative about  g.  Since  the error term  (w)  will 
generally be  serially correlated,  use  of OLS  will yield consistent but 
inefficient parameter  estimates.  A  generalized  least squares  approach  or 
some  other method  of prefiltering the time  series  is used.  Sims  suggests 
a specific filter (1-.75LI2  where it  is  applied to  the natural  logs of 
the  time  series.  Sims  reports that this is successful  in  flattening the 
spectral  density of most  economic  time series.  Sims  does  report, 
however,  that his filter does  not completely  prewhiten  the  series.  Feige 
and  Pearce  (1979)  show  that the choice of prefiltering does  affect the 
F-statistics.  We,  therefore,  estimate equation  (10)  using the  iterative 
Cochran-Orcutt  estimation technique  to  correct for first-order serial 
correlation. 
Four  combinations of results from the Sims  test are possible,  and it 
is instructive to  examine  the various policies these  results may  imply. 
First, private Investment may  influence pub1  ic investment.  In  this case, 
public capital formation is  passively responding  to the needs  of  private 
investment.  According  to  the model , as  private investment  increases, 
demand  for labor  and  thus payrolls also increase,  expanding  the  income of 
the local economy.  With  a higher  income,  the median  voter demands  a 
greater  amount  of public  services,  including public investment. 
Consequently,  public investment does  not appear  to  be  used  as  a 
growth-stimulating policy instrument. 
Second,  publtc investment  influences private investment.  This case 
provides  the strongest  evidence possible from the Sims  test that public 
investment  stimulates private investment.  Although other factors.are undoubtedly important in explaining private investment, the model 
indicates that public investment,  by yielding higher profits to local 
firms, attracts additional investment into the area. 
'  Third, the direction of influence may go  both ways.  This would 
indicate either that the direction of  influence switches from one time 
period to  the next, possibly due to  various external  events, or that 
there are strong feedback effects present throughout the entire time 
period. 
Fourth, there is  no statistical relationship between pub1  ic and 
private investment.  This statement should be qualified  by the 
possibility that the model  is misspecified.  Nonetheless, it may be the 
case that decisions to  invest in the private sector and  in the public 
sector are totally independent.  Possible examples of  this are cities 
dominated by a dingle industry, such as Detroit, Rochester, or Seattle. 
Another possibility is that public investment is used as a policy 
instrument, but is  ineffective. 
111.  Data 
Annual  total  public outlays for central cities within 40 SMSAs were 
collected for the period 1904-78 from City Finances.  Public capital 
outlay is defined as direct expenditure for contract or force account 
construction of  buildings, roads, and other improvements, and for 
purchases of  equipment, land, and existing structures.  Included as total 
outlays are expenditures on 
a)  sanitary and storm sewers and  sewage disposal facilities, 
b)  roadways, sidewalks, and all  structures and improvements 
necessary for their use, such as to-11  highways,  bridges and 
tunnel  s, C)  hospital  s, 
dl  public service enterprises,  which  includes airports and  ports. 
Annual  total private investment  for manufactures was  collected over 
the same  time period from  the Census  of  Manufactures and  the Annual 
Survey of  Manufactures.  Investment was  estimated for SMSAs  usi  ng  1977 
boundary  definitions.  Both  series are converted to constant 1967  dollars 
by  using the Engineering News-Record  indexes. 
One  obvious difficulty with relating the two  time  series is that 
public outlays are available only for central cities over  the entire time 
period,  while private investment  is  for the entire SMSA.  The  severity of 
this problem varies across  cities and  time periods.  For  instance,  prior 
to  World  War  11,  central  cities comprised most  of the SMSA  and  definitely 
dominated  fiscal  expenditures.  Even  after World War  11,  central cities 
provided much  of the major  water  treatment facilities and  contained much 
of  the highway  complexes.  In  recent years  in  which  SMSA-level 
expenditures are available,  we  find that the percentage of  total outlays 
in  an  SMSA  by central  cities varies from an  average of 30  percent to over 
90  percent.  The  city of Cleveland,  for example,  accounted for 
approximately 28  percent of total SMSA  expenditures on public capital 
during 1965-81,  although it  contributed close to  90 percent of  water 
treatment expenditures.  New  York  City,  on  the other hand,  contributed 
nearly 80  percent of the  total SMSA  expenditures on public infrastructure 
during the same  time period.  Thus,  one  would expect  services provided by 
central cities to  spill over  into the rest of the SMSA.    here fore,  the 
public investment  series  is  useful  in  exploring lead and  lag 
relationships between  local public and  private investment. IV.  Results 
Recogni  zi ng that private and pub1  ic expenditures over three-quarters 
of  a century have been  i nf  1  uenced by  significant events and overall 
structural changes in  behavior, we estimate the Sims test for pre- and 
post-World  War I1 periods as well as for the entire 75-year period.  The 
analysis examines 40 SMSAs.  The plots contained in figures 1-6  are 
representative of the sample of SMSAs.  Investment in  public 
infrastructure is characterized  by cyclical  upturns and downturns, which 
in  some cases follow the major business cycles during this century.  With 
few exceptions, the older, pre-WWII cities exhibited tremendous increases 
in  public capital formation during the new era prosperity of  the 1920s. 
This boom was followed by a severe drop in  public investment during the 
Great Depression.  Very little activity occurred during the austere years 
of World  War 11, and it was not until  the capital goods boom of  the 
mid-1950s that we also see a significant increase in  public capital  stock 
formation.  Due partly to increased suburbanization and the increased 
role of  the federal government in financing  public infrastructure, public 
investment  in the latter quarter of  the century is not as large and not 
as cyclical as found in the earlier period. 
Even though these generalizations are applicable to  most of the 
SMSAs, each SMSA exhibits some unique characteristics.  Cleveland and 
Akron (figures  1  and 2). for example, show strong cyclical patterns 
throughout the entire time period with private investment apparently 
leading public investment before WWII and public leading private after 
the war.  Seattle and Portland  (figures  3 and 4) reveal somewhat 
different  patterns.  Public investment in the early part of  the century exceeds private investment at several points in time.  Seattle 
demonstrates a fairly haphazard lead-lag  pattern whereas Portland's  is 
somewhat more regular.  Atlanta  (figure  5)  is illustrative of several  of 
the "growth" areas in which private leads public investment, particulary 
during the postwar period.  Houston  (figure  6) is definitely a post-WWII 
city.  Very little public or private investment was made during the first 
half of the century,  but the second half shows tremendous private 
investment that dwarfs public investment. 
Sims Test Results  Results of the Sims test are meant to  be 
suggestive of  the relationships that may exist between private and public 
investment.  As discussed earlier, this is a test of  predictive power and 
not of structural causation.  Interpretation of the results, therefore, 
must be made with considerable discretion.  The results are shown in 
table 1  with asterisks indicating that the null  hypothesis that public 
does not influence private investment  (or  private does not influence 
public) is rejected at the .05  percent significance level.  When the test 
is applied to  the entire time series  (actually  from 1916 to  1966, since 
we used 12  future and past lags),  neither null  hypothesis could be 
rejected for 29  of  the 40 SMSAs.  The null  hypothesis that public 
investment does not influence private investment was rejected for 21  of 
the 40 SMSAs.  The null  hypothesis that private investment does not 
influence public investment was rejected for only eight SMSAs.  Stated 
differently, neither hypothesis could be rejected for 16 of  the 40 
SMSAs.  In addition, these results show a dominance of public investment 
influencing private investment,  an  important  result for the use  of  public investment as  a 
policy instrument. 
When  the sample  was  divided into pre-  and  post-WHII periods  using 
four  leads  and  lags,  the results change.  In  this case,  the null 
hypotheses  could not be  rejected for only seven  SMSAs.  In  the pre-war 
period,  private investment  influenced public investment for six SMSAs, 
whereas  public influenced private for 10 SMSAs.  During the postwar 
period,  private investment  influenced  public for 10 SMSAs,  and  public 
influenced  private investment  for  nine SMSAs. 
The  dominance  of  public influencing private investment  is reduced 
when  shorter periods of time are considered:  public investment  influenced 
private investment for 19  SMSAs  while private influenced public for  16 
SMSAs.  One  reason for this difference may  be  that the four future  and 
past  lags may  not be  long enough  to  pick up  the effect of  public on 
private for some  cities.  When  the entire period was  used,  coefficients 
of the eleventh and  twelfth leads  were  statistically significant  in-some 
cases.  Thus,  nine SMSAs  that rejected the nu1  1 hypothesis  that pub1  ic 
does  not influence private investment  when  the 12-year  lag was  used  in 
the longer  period could not reject it  when  shorter lags were  necessary. 
This problem was  offset to  some  extent by  the ability to  control for 
different structural relationships before and  after the war.  For 
example,  seven  SMSAs  that did not reject the null hypothesis when  the 
period spanned  both pre-war  and  postwar  periods rejected it  when  the time 
period was  divided. 
Directional Relationships  across  SMSAs  In  order  to  explore whether  the 
direction of influence between  public and  private investment  (or no relationship at all) differs systematically across SMSAs,  we  use  logit 
analysis to  explain the  significant F-statistics in  which  the dependent 
variable equals one if significant at the  .05  percent level and  zero 
otherwise.  The  results are  shown  in  table 2.  The  regional  location of 
SMSAs  were  indicated by  the  WEST  and  SOUTH  dummy  variables,  with the rest 
of the country  included in the  intercept.  The  variable EARLY  is a 
measure  of the relative timing of the placement  of public.infrastructure 
and  the needs  of the population.  It is computed  as  the difference 
between  the year  in  which maximum  population  (MAXPOPY)  was  reached  in the 
central  city and  the year  in  which maximum  public capital  stock  was 
obtained in the central  city.  Thus,  if  public capital  stock peaks  before 
population (EARLY  greater than zero),  then the SMSA  may  be  considered  to 
have  more  foresight in  establishing an  infrastructure base  for  future 
economic  activity. 
The  results show  that private investment  is  more  likely to influence 
public  investment  for SMSAs  located in  the South  than in  the rest of  the 
country.  In  addition,  the  sooner  public infrastructure is put in  place 
vis-a-vis the  size of the population (EARLY  is  positive),  the more  likely 
public investment  will influence private investment. 
Siqn and  Magnitude of the Correlation between  Investment  Series  The 
Sirns  test reveals significant relationships between  private and  public 
investment  for a number  of SMSAs  in  the sample,  but it  1 s unable  to 
reveal  the magnitude  and  sign of the correlation between  pub1  lc  and 
private investment.  We  estimate this effect  for  the pre-war  and  postwar 
periods for a subsample  of SMSAs  using a  slightly different approach. Because  of  the strong possibility that other factors  affect investment 
decisions  in  both the private and public sectors,  each  time series was 
regressed on past values of itself (Haynes  and  Stone,  1985).  The 
residuals,  thus purged of  most of  this extraneous  influence,  are used  as 
innovations of  each  time series.  The  innovations of private investment 
are subsequently  regressed on  present and  past values of innovations of 
public investment  and  vice versa.  The  sum  of the coefficients of  lags 
1-6  are shown  in  table 3.  If  one  considers  six years  to  be  sufficiently 
long to  capture most of  the  influence of  one  investment  on  the other, 
then the sum  can  be  interpreted as  the long-run effect. 
The  first  result to  notice in  table 3  is  that all statistically 
significant coefficients are positive.  Thus,  an  increase  in  one  type of 
investment  brings about  an  increase  in  investment of the other type. 
Second,  with only a few  exceptions,  the relationships that were  found  to 
be  significant using the Sims  test,  were  also statlstically significant 
in  these  regressions. 
Results  show  that the  long-run effect of private investment on public 
investment  is  always  less than one.  Furthermore,  the effect appears  to 
be  much  larger in  the prewar  period than in  the postwar  period.  The 
relative magnitudes  between  the two periods are reversed for the  long-run 
effect of  public investment on  private investment.  However,  estimates of 
$11  of private investment  for every $1  of public investment,  as  was 
estimated for  Cleveland,  seems  somewhat  large.  These  magnitudes  are not 
surprising when  one  considers  the ratio  of private investment to  public 
investment.  During the prewar  period,  the ratio  for Cleveland averaged 
about  3  whereas  in  the postwar  period it  was  closer to  8.  As discussed earlier, these high figures may result from the fact that only central 
city expend1  tures on pub1  ic outlays were avai  lable.  The percentage of 
total  outlays by the city of Cleveland compared to  the entire SMSA, for 
example, is much lower during the latter period than the former.  Thus, 
given the fact that the population in  the city of Cleveland  peaked in 
1952, while the SMSA population continued to grow, one would expect the 
percentage of public outlays by  the city with respect to total  SMSA 
outlays to  fall over this period.  When  it  is possible to  find SMSA-level 
data, we find  that the ratio of city outlays to  SMSA outlays is .25 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  Akron's ratio is higher at around  -45 and 
thus its estimated long-run effect is  lower than Cleveland's.  It is 
interesting to compare our results with estimates obtained using 
cross-sectional  data for the late 1960s and the 1970s when public outlays 
by  SMSAs are available.  Deno (19861,  using the same private investment 
estimates and the same sample of SMSAs as we used, estimated the long-run 
effect to be 0.28. 
V.  Concluding Remarks 
The basic question addressed in this paper Is whether public outlays 
influence private investment.  A precondition for public outlays to be 
considered a policy instrument is that public outlays must precede 
private investment.  This sequence of events does not ensure, however, 
that public outlays will  be  effective in  stimulating local economic 
activity.  A more complete identification of the causal  links between 
public outlays and private investment would require estimating a full 
structural  model.  We have posited a simple model of the urban economy that relates public infrastructure and private economic activity. 
Unfortunately, sufficient  time-series data are not available to  estimate 
the structural  model. 
The reduced-form  equations from the structural model  offers  another 
approach to  estimating this relationship.  The Sims test is used to 
estimate the direction of  influence between the two investment series. 
In only seven out of  the 40 cases, do  we find no statistically 
significant relationship between public outlays and private investment. 
For half of the cities, public outlays influenced private investment; 
for a smaller number of cities private investment preceded public 
investment. 
We have explored a number of factors to  explain differences in the 
dominant direction of influence, but  we have found only two significant 
characteristics.  Private investment is more likely to  influence public 
outlays in cities located in  the South.  One interpretation of  this 
finding is that local  governments in the South are less apt to  use public 
funds for development purposes, especi  a1  ly before World War 11.  We a1  so 
found that public outlays were more likely to  precede private investment 
in cities in which the level of public capital  stock peaked prior to  the 
population peak of each city. 
Based on our estimated publ  ic capital  stock series derived from these 
public outlay data, investments by central city and special  district 
governments have not been sufficient to  mai  ntai  n the publ  i c capital  stock 
of  many cities included in the sample since the 1950s.  While this is 
consistent with the declining population of  these cities during this 
period,  it still  leaves open the question of  how much should cities  - invest in infrastructure.  Although  this question obviously cannot  be 
answered  with the present  analysis,  the findings  in this paper  do  suggest 
a  more  active role for infrastructure  in regional  growth  than existing 
research has  identified. Bibliography 
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2  3 Table  1 :  F-Statistic of the Sims  Test for "Granger" Causation 
between  Public and  Private Investment  in  Selected SMSAs, 
1904-1978. 
PreWWII  PostWWI  1  904-1  978 
SMSA  A  B  A  B  A  B 
Akron  2.49  .67  .45  7.56*  3.51*  2.57* 
Atlanta  1.40  3.72'  2.23  1.87  4.27*  1.12 
Baltimore  .73  .80  1.08  2.04  .88  1.56 
Birmingham  1.88  2.37  2.43  2.02  4.22*  2.27* 
Buffalo 
Canton 
Chi  cago 
Cincinnati 
Cl  eve1  and 
Col  umbu s 
Dal 1  as 
Dayton 
Denver 




I  nd i  anapol i  s 
Jersey City 
Kansas  City Table 1 (continued) 
Los  Angeles  1.02  1.53  .51  .37  .73  .86 
Louisville  .89  5.19*  8.48*  .81  1.49  1.79 
Mernph i  s  .68  3.30*  2.00  -31  4.84*  .69 
Mi  1  waukee  2.91*  5.95*  .36  5.72*  1.30  16.08* 
Minneapolis  3.54*  .83  .52  1.60  .95  18.18* 
Newark  2.09  -92  1 .ll  .85  .97  6.77* 
New  Orleans 
New  York 
Phi  ladelphia 
Pittsburgh 
Port  1  and 
Readi ng 
Ri  chmond 
Rochester 
San  Diego 
Seattle 
San  Franci  sco 
St.  Louis 
To1  edo 
Youngstown 
Total  significant  6  10  10  9  8  2  1 
at .05  percent Note:  A:  Private investment "Granger" causes public investment; 
B:  Public investment "Granger" causes private investment. 
The pre-WWII period  begins in 1904 and ends in  1945;  the 
post-WWII period begins in 1946 and ends in 1978.  The 
Sims Test was performed with four period leads and lags for these 
two subperiods.  Pub1  ic investment is total  pub1  ic outlays 
by central cities in each SMSA obtained from City Finances, 1904- 
1978.  Private investment is investment by manufacturers  within 
the SMSA obtained from Annual  Survey of  Manufactures and other 
sources.  The combined period estimation of  the Sims Test was 
performed with 12 period leads and lags. 
The asterisk (*) denotes .05  significance level. 
Source:  Author's calculations. Table 2:  Factors related to  the significance  of  the Sims  Test 
for selected SMSAs,  1904-1978 
Direction of  Hypothesized "Granger" Causation 
Variable  Private to Pub1  ic  Pub1 i  c  to Private 
Constant  1.95  -43.44  -52.78  1.62  3.79  -16.10 -36.30  4.47 
(6.32)  (1.37)  (1.65)  (5.21)  (4.76)  (.14)  (.31)  (4.33) 
West 
South  1.19  .  -87  .73  1.07  -1 -55  -2.58  -2.89  -1.30 
(2.32)  (1.60)  (1.33)  (1.99)  (.91)  (1.32)  (1.46)  (.73) 
Ear 1  y 
Maxpop 
Capn 
Note:  Dependent  variable equals one  (zero) if  F-statistic derived from  the 
Sims  test is statistically significant (insignificant)  at the 5 percent 
level.  T-statistics are  in  parentheses.  The  variable WEST  denotes  SMSAs 
in  the western U.S.;  SOUTH  denotes  SMSAs  in  the southern U.S.;  with the 
northeast and  the midwest  included in  the intercept.  The  variable EARLY 
is the difference between  the year  in  which maximum  population  (MAXPOPY) 
was  reached  and  the year  in  which maximum  pub1  ic capital  stock  was 
obtained.  MAXPOP  is the maximum  population of the central city in  the 
SMSA.  CAPN  is  the maximum  public capital  stock of  the central city in 
the SMSA. 
Source:  Author's  calculations. Table 3:  Sum  of the Estimated  Lag  Distributions of the Influence 
of Private Investment on Public Investment and 
Public Investment on Private Investment  for Selected SMSAs 
SMS A  A  B  A  B 
Cl eve  1  and  .42  .38  .014  10.71 
Houston.  .83  .64  .29  2.69 
(.97)  (1.31)  (1.05)  ( .44) 
Port  1  and  .94  -.04  .03  -3.67 
( .64)  (.14>  (.I61  (1.02) 
Indi  anapol i  s  .70  .83 
(1.19)  (1.63) 
Pittsburgh  .21  -1.66  .83  .74 
(.94)  (1.41  (1.56)  (.  12) 
Mi  nneapol i  s  .52  .77  .41  3.96 
(2.14)  ( .70)  (1.18)  ( .56) 
Dayton  1.46  -.20 
(1.24)  (1.19) 
Akron  .36  .43 
(1.85)  ( .26) 
Rochester  -29  .43  -15  .27 
(2.25)  (.57>  (1.04)  (.lo) 
Atlanta  .56  .92 
(1.18)  (2.43) 
Philadelphia  -77  .26 
(1.93)  ( .45) 
Note:  Model  A  (B)  regresses  the innovations of current public (private) 
investment  on  innovations of private (public)  investment  with lags 0-6. 
The  estimate reported in  the table is  the sum  of the coefficients of lags 
1-6.  For  each  time series,  innovations are the residuals from  a 
regression of  the series on  a dlstrlbuted lag of past values out four 
years. 
Source:  Author's  calculations. Figure 1 
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'  SOURCE: Author's analysis. Figure  2 
Akron Public and Private Outlays 1904-1978 
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SOURCE:  Author's analysis. Figure 3 
Seattle Public  and Private Outlays 1904-1978 
SOURCE:  Author's  analysis. 
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Portland Public and Private Outlays 1904-1978 
Private Investment  D  o---o--m-mommm--m-v  Government Investment 
SOURCE: Author's analysis. Figure 5 
Atlanta Public  and Private Outlays 1904-1978 
SOURCE:  Author's  analysis. Figure 6 
Houston Public and Private Outlays 1904-1978 
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SOURCE:  Author's analysis. 